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observations, in the M eno P lato was exploring the teachability o f virtue, and the discussion of anam nesis is not so much in the context of geom etry as it is in the context of an analogy between m oral and geom etrical reasoning. It is Plato's interest in this analogy which is the focus of W eil's attention, and she finds the analogy to be m uch closer than we m ay be inclined to think it is.
She also finds geom etry closer to m athem atics than we perhaps do. We acknowledge their proxim ity, and th at both can be given expression in algebraic term s, but the G reeks, claims W eil, discovered th at geom etry is about numbers. " G eom etry... [is] the science of w hat is today called real num bers, of which the square root of two or o f any other num ber not square is an exam ple... G eom etry... [is] the science of irrational square ro o ts." 5 I think th a t one can find this discovery deeply impressive. For instance, one can be fam iliar with the Pythagorean Theorem ; one can know th at the discovery of incom m ensurables -irrational num bers -presented a profound difficulty for Greek rationalism ; and one can be aw are that the diagonal o f a square is an exam ple in geom etry of a length which cannot be expressed as an exact num erical proportion of (i.e., which is incom m ensurable with) the length of one of the sides of the square. Even in the presence of such knowledge, a question like the following can arise -as this one once did for m e: " I wonder if the length of the diagonal is the square root of anything connected with the sq uare?" For a m om ent this was a real question to which I did not have the answer. Then it dawned : " O f course, the square o f the diagonal is equal to the sum of the squares o f two of the sides... ju st as the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum o f the squares on the o ther two sides... not ju s t as, they're the sam e thing! A square is a square. (The P ythagorean Theorem is not about m apping the area o f a farm er's fields, or about diagram s in the sand, it is about m easuring an irrational square root in m athem atics.) And there, m om entarily, I felt the inspiration of seeing th at geom etry is num ber theory.
The necessity involved here is not ju st th at o f a priori observation : that this is how it m u st be. N o r is it, as we are often told, ju st im portant as an illustration of the problem o f incom m ensurables. The im portance of the Pythagorean Theorem for the G reeks, W eil tells us, was th at it solved the problem of incom m ensurables; it perm itted rational expression in term s of geom etry (the diagonal o f a square with sides o f one unit in length) of a m agnitude which is irrational in term s of num bers (the square root of two). In its proper context, this assum es religious significance. It was a confirm ation o f the faith : th a t the elem ents of num bers are the elements of all things, and th a t the universe is intelligible. As evidence that P lato also thought this way, Weil cites the E pinom is, where he speaks of : w hat is ridiculously called land-m easuring and is really the assim ilation to one another o f num bers not naturally sim ilar, an assim ilation m ade m anifest by the destiny o f plane figures. It is clear to anyone who is able to understand it th at this marvel is not o f hum an but o f divine origin.6 It is not surprising, then, th at num bers and divine things go together in this way. A ristotle tells us th at the Pythagoreans were devoted to m athem atics, and thought that its principles were the principles of all things -and even th a t " the whole heaven is num bers." 7 T here is also a rem ark by Proclus to the effect that " Pythagoras turned geom etrical philosophy into a form o f liberal education by seeking its first principles in a higher realm of reality." 8 It would have been surprising if the Lecture on the G ood had not had a good deal to do with num bers. The connections with goodness and with divinity are quite real. Perhaps it is in recognition o f the marvel th at this is so, and th at we can see it (that it is revealed to us), th at Weil says: " Simple intellectual curiosity cannot give one contact with the thought of Pythagoras and Plato, because in regard to thought of th at kind knowledge and adhesion are one single act of the m ind." 9 Religious language comes naturally here. By " adhesion" Weil clearly intends som ething like " faith" . C om m itm ent is a part of the idea. But this " b e lie f' m ust not be confused with w hat we ordinarily distinguish by th at nam e from knowledge. F aith is not a m atter of im perfect knowledge, or of com m itm ent in the absence o f adequate evidence. It is the certainty which comes with the clear vision of what is absolutely and eternally necessary.
A nother point of im portance is th at m any concepts besides num ber and necessity cross here. In her notes on Philolaus, Weil has a rem arkable passage in which the notions of logos, num ber, necessity, geom etry, harm ony and equilibrium are all connected. Indeed, she traces the presence of all of them in the " m ediation" o f C hristian theology. She co n clu d es:
These com parisons m ay appear arbitrary, but they confer perfect coherence and intelligibility upon texts which, if I m istake not, can acquire it only in this way. There is no other criterion for piecing together a fragm ented mosaic. The sole alternative to this interpretation is to concede th at the G reeks w rote incoherent and unintelligible things. T h at is w hat people have done up to now, but they were wrong. The m istake was to judge the G reeks as if they were like ourselves.1" Later, on her death bed, she was to w rite m ore abruptly of the integration of these n o tio n s:
There are idiots who speak o f syncretism in connection with Plato. But there is no need to syncretize w hat is all one thing. In Thales, A naxim ander, H eraclitus, 6 . P l a t o , Epinomis, 990d. (Weil acknowledges this work as " apocrypha" . The translation is hers ; see On Science, p. 16, Intim ations o f Christianity, p. 161, and Seventy Letters, p. 121.) 7. A r is t o t l e , Metaphysics, A5, 985-6. 8. G.S. K ir k a n d J. E. R a v e n , The Presocratic Philosophers ( C a m b rid g e : C a m b rid g e U n iv e rs ity P re s s, 1964), (h e re a fte r : K i r k a n d R a v e n ) , fr a g m e n t 277. Socrates, Pythagoras, there is the same doctrine, the single Greek doctrine, expressed through different tem peram ents." H ow can she im agine th at so m any different concepts com e together here? Greek rationalism held th at the universe is intelligible. W hether or not som ething is intelligible depends indirectly upon w hat is acknowledged to be an explanation, but you cannot set about explaining if you do not know what there is to be explained. A ccordingly, a pre-requisite for intelligibility is m ensurability -being able to say w hat the lim its of a thing are. M easuring is only possible against a standard. A prim itive m odel is the balance -equal weights placed at the ends of a balanced beam will not disturb the equilibrium (assum ing that the beam is uniform , and balanced at its m id-point). The notions of balance, equilibrium , equality, m easure, intelligibility and rationality are all thus connected. How this is m ediated in C hristian theology, especially through the symbol o f the cross, is a question which I shall leave aside, but there are further points which I shall pursue. Consider the Pythagoreans.
From a letter written to
W hat has been discussed so far is not inconsistent with the received opinion about the Pythagorean religious com m unity, about the secrecy surrounding the mysteries revealed in their study/w orship, and about their achievem ents in num ber theory. Som e of it is illustrated by the fam iliar assim ilation of the num ber series to points geom etrically arranged in triangles, squares, rectangles and solid form s.12 The expression o f the series of odd and even num bers is especially germ ane. The odd num bers are arranged, beginning with the point:
.
(1), :: (1 + 3), : : : (1 + 3 + 5 ), etc.
Each successive odd num ber is arranged around the previous figure, and m akes a square of g reater m agnitude; the first square is one unit per side, the next is two units by two units, and so on. Sim ilarly, the even num bers m ake a series of figures, beginning with the line:
.. (2), : : : (2 + 4 ), (2 + 4 + 6 ), etc.
Each successive even num ber, arranged around the previous figure, m akes a rectangle of greater m a g n itu d e ; but in this case the shape of the figure is constantly changing. The first is one unit by two units, the second is two by three, and so on. The ratio does not rem ain the same. Because of this difference the odd num bers, and especially the unit (1), were taken to em body the principle of Lim it and U n ity ; the even num bers, and especially the dyad (2), em bodied Diversity and the U nlim ited. The Lim ited is the first principle, and the unchanging. The U nlim ited is responsible for division and for change. This is the clearest and sim plest of the aspects of Pythagoreanism which show the confluence o f num ber, geom etrical form and higher principles. W hat we have discussed so far is also com patible with the famous Pythagorean discovery o f the relation between m athem atical proportions and musical intervals. For a m usician, the discovery th at m ediaeval plainsong is not only historically and m usically, but also m athem atically the foundation o f harm ony, is a discovery which can be revelatory. The first four integers contain the whole secret of the musical scale, and since the m ost obvious connection between the proportions in num bers a 1 the harm onies in music is found in the geom etrical proportions of a divided line (a string), it is revealing th at these subjects are associated as they are, for instance by Plato in the Republic. There, as Weil points out, the geom etrical term s are explicitly extended to m orality. The prelim inary attem pts to teach a soul virtue (to m ake it harm onious and balanced) consist in making the child fam iliar with music and dancing.
A t two im portant points, however, Sim one Weil stands in defiance of modern scholarly opinion. She does not agree with those who think th a t A ristotle should be taken literally when he says t h a t : " All suppose num bers to consist of abstract units, except the P y th a g o re a n s; but they suppose the num bers to have m agnitude." 13 Raven takes this to m ean th a t the Pythagoreans were unable to think of num ber abstractly, separately from space. He observes th at such an incapacity would prevent the discovery o f things m athem atical which have no geom etrical analogues or which imply new geom etries. I f he is correct, Raven is also able to take Zeno to be attacking with som e o f his paradoxes the specifically P ythagorean doctrine th at units and atom s of space coincide.14 N either consideration is conclusive, although A ristotle, himself, is confident. W eil, however, would have Pythagoreans acknowledge th at num bers need not be m aterial. Even if Raven is correct about the pre-Parm enidean Pythagoreans, Weil is safe with the later tradition, and with P lato (who could certainly tell num bers from spaces, and who found the way their proportions were m anifest in each other " a m arvel of divine origin" ). In the end, even if they did think th at num bers are spatially extended (confusing num ber with m agnitude), Pythagorean appreciation of non physical principles is as old as the tradition itself:
H arm ony in the Pythagorean sense, is always m ysterious. It represents the sim ultaneous conception of w hat is conceived separately. For example, the sequence of odd num bers and the sequence of the squares. The dem onstration of this is perfectly clear, and yet it rem ains a m ystery. The odd num ber partakes of the nature of unity in th a t it is indivisible and at the same tim e in th at it generates the squares.
In the eyes o f the Pythagoreans, the elem ent in m athem atics which eludes dem onstration, th a t is to say the coincidences, is m ade up of symbols for truths concerning G o d .15
The second point of contention is W eil's inclusion o f the Philolaus fragm ents am ong her prim ary Pythagorean texts. The score o f fragm ents attributed to Philolaus, who was roughly contem porary with Socrates, are, if they are genuine, our best inform ation about fifth century Pythagoreanism . They would also represent a part of the Pythagorean influence on P la to .16 U nfortunately their authenticity has been under attack for m ore than a century, and as Raven puts i t : " On the whole the argum ent m ust be pronounced so far to have gone in favour of the prosecution." 17 Weil is particularly interested in two of the fragm ents. One is cryptic: " A nd all things that can be known contain num ber; w ithout this nothing could be thought or know n." 18 The second helps to elucidate the fir s t:
As regards nature and harm ony, it is as follows. T hat which constitutes the eternal essence of things, and nature itself, is the object of divine and not of hum an knowledge, except for th is: It would be impossible for us to know anything of w hat exists if there were not, to begin with, the essence of the things which constitute the order o f the world, both the reality which determ ines and the reality which is indeterm inate. But since at the beginning there are found dissim ilar principles, o f different kinds, it would be impossible for an order o f the world to arise out of them unless harm ony were added to them , in whatever m anner produced. Sim ilar things, of the same kind, have no need of harm ony. But things which are neither sim ilar nor o f the same kind or rank need to be locked in by a harm ony ap p ro p riate for enclosing them within a world o rd e r.19
This has the appearance o f audacious epistem ological theory. A re we reading this into an innocent tex t? O r is it an anachronism ? Som e have found it unbelievable that it m ight have been propounded at a tim e when the critical enquiry, " How is knowledge possible?" was scarcely started (and it was started, anyhow, by Socrates, Plato says), m uch less settled. A ristotle's failure to attrib u te any such sophisticated epistem ologi cal insight either to Philolaus or to other P ythagoreans is further evidence that these fragm ents m ust be regarded as post-A ristotelian forgeries. Weil evidently considers Philolaus genuine. I do not think th a t m uch depends on this. If it took P lato to add this im portant developm ent to the Pythagorean tradition, th at would not disrupt the coherence of th at tradition. N or, indeed, would it vitiate the adum bration o f this doctrine in the general view th at all things are m ade of num bers. It is, however, crucial th at the observation be m ade -th at w ithout num bers nothing could be thought or known. Weil begins here to trace the foundation of a philosophy o f science; the principles o f num ber and harm ony are the necessary prerequisite for any knowledge, including knowledge o f nature. It is not ju st th at we m ust have a cosm os rather than a chaos before anything can be intelligible, although this is one way in which she expresses the requirem ent th at truth be the guiding concept in any attem pt at understanding or explaining anything. Weil m akes the further claim th at the dom inance o f order over chaos takes the form of m ediation 16 . E.g., Phaedo, 61d-e: Cebes -" W hat do you mean, Socrates, by saying... that the philosopher would be willing to follow the dying?" " Why, Cebes," he said, " have not you and Simmias heard all about such things from Philolaus, when you were his pupils?"
17. K i r k and R a v e n , p. 309. See Ch. X III for an assessment of the most im portant evidence.
18. K ir k a n d R a v e n , fr a g m e n t 400. between things not obviously co n n ected : between odd num bers and squares, between square roots and diagonals, between flotation and displacem ent ( c /, A rchim edes), for instance. The perfect, and necessary, relations which constitute these m ediations bring to our discussion the concepts o f equilibrium , proportion, balance, equivalence and harm ony. T hus: E quilibrium , in so far as equilibrium defines limits, is the essential idea of science; by means of this idea every change, and therefore every phenom enon, is considered as a rupture of eq uilibrium ...; and this... m akes all disequilibria an im age of equilibrium , all changes an im age of the m otionless, and tim e an image of eternity.20
In order to appreciate properly the connection which Weil sees between num bers and nature, and between necessity and physics, we need not only to understand the passage ju st cited, but also to consider the essays on quantum physics. A lthough the latter are sufficiently technical to defy adequate sum m ary, I shall try to deal with both in the following section.
II
The principles of num ber and harm ony are the precondition of any intelligibility, and Weil would add that they are religious principles. " This is the discovery that intoxicated the G re e k s: th a t the reality o f the sensible universe is constituted by a necessity whose laws are the sym bolic expression of the m ysteries of faith." 21 She claim s, further, th at to read num bers in the universe and to love the universe go together. " A ncient science was m ore suitable for such reading than is m odern science." 22 Now, very roughly, Weil argues th a t classical m odern physics has been G reek science m inus som ething, and th a t contem porary physics is the classical theory with som ething further om itted. Science since Galileo has left out the love o f the evident divinity o f the requisite necessity. In the early twentieth century, physics, especially in quantum theory, has left out the necessity itself, and hence intelligibility. W hat content can these claims be given?
T h at classical m odern science is an incom plete version of ancient science, Weil argues in great detail on m any different occasions. For instance:
The whole of classical science is already contained in the w orks of Eudoxus and A rchim edes. To Eudoxus, the friend of P lato and pupil of one of the last authentic Pythagoreans, are attrib u ted the theory of generalized num ber and the invention of the integral calcu lu s; he invented the com bination of circular and uniform movem ents carried out on the sam e sphere but around different axes and at different velocities, so as to furnish a m echanical model which accounted perfectly for all the astronom ical facts know n in his day. The idea of the sam e moving body carrying out at the sam e tim e several different m otions whose resultant is a p articular trajectory is the very basis of kinetics and is necessary for the conception of a com bination o f fo rc e s; all we have done since is to substitute 20 linear for circular m otion and to introduce acceleration. T hat is the sole difference between our conception of stellar m otion and th at of Eudoxus, because, although N ew ton said a great deal about force of attraction, gravity is no m ore than uniform ly accelerated m otion in the direction of the sun. A rchim edes was the founder not only of statics but of the whole of mechanics by his purely m athem atical theory o f the balance, the lever, and the centre of g ra v ity ; and the whole of physics is contained in germ in his theory o f the equilibrium o f floating bodies, which is also purely m athem atical and which am ounts to considering a fluid as an ensemble of levers superim posed on one another with an axis of sym m etry playing the part of the fulcrum. Teachers today very m istakenly reduce these m arvellous conceptions to the rank of totally uninteresting em pirical observations.23
One way of showing w hat is lacking of ancient science in the classical, consists in pointing out the flatness of concepts which once had significance on m any levels, a " haunting resonance" which was not left out when the concepts were employed scientifically. The idea of equilibrium is one of W eil's examples. N ot just im portant in physics, it was at the centre of G reek th o u g h t; and the balance was a symbol of equity, one o f the prim ary v irtu es.24 The lever, which in A rchim edes' thought pits displacem ent against flotation, is also the set of scales, symbol of balanced and im partial judgm ent, held by the blindfolded figure of Justice. The notion of balance has prim acy over other related concepts (for instance, " heavier th a n " ). This conceptual priority can be seen if we think of a situation in which equal weights placed at the ends o f a balanced beam would result in an im balance. Perhaps one o f the weights is affected by a m agnet. Perhaps the beam itself is not true, but is shorter and heavier on one side than on the other. These and other possible explanations are derivative cases, understood only as m odifications o f the prim ary case of perfect balance. The latter, we might say, is p art of the system of m easurem ent. It m akes the draw ing of the other distinctions possible. 25 This prim acy is part of the concept in all o f its m ain uses, in physics, geom etry, law and theology, and is the m ediator of the various uses, preserving the unity of the concept. Difficult though it is for us to preserve the m oral and religious senses of a term when doing science -for ordinary language is ill-adapted for displaying differences of level -these are part o f the original significance of the term s, and are crucial to the intelligibility of Greek thought. Classical science deliberately leaves out differences of level. " If the algebra of physicists gives the im pression of profundity it is because it is entirely f la t; the third dim ension o f thought is m issing." 26 T here is profundity. The w riting is esoteric, intelligible only to the very learned -and it may be of far-reaching significance within the notation in question. But so far as the other dim ensions o f hum an understanding are concerned the algebra is m ute. T here is only the illusion of m etaphysical profundity. W e believe, of course, that m odern science has deliberately left out this profundity, and the religious resonances, in the interest of probity and greater intelligibility. Weil analyzes our delusion in this w ay: The continuous and the discontinuous are both given to us. (W eil's illustrations here are, of the former, that we cannot pass from one side of a river to the other w ithout crossing it, and o f the latter, th at we can find no interm ediary between iron and gold.) A perfect balance between these two givens is the necessity which is presupposed by any intelligibility in a field where these principles operate. Because of its deference to uniform linear m otion,27 because of its am bition to be able to explain everything w ithout exception, and because of the presuppositions of its m ain m athem atical tool (the calculus), am ong other causes, classical science m istakenly identified necessity with the continuous. As a result :
Classical science w anted to suppress the discontinuous, so inevitably it stum bled over it and the shock was felt at the very centre of physics, in its main d epartm ent, in the study o f energy itself, which was to have been the m eans of suppressing the discontinuous; in other words, it was felt in the study of therm odynam ics... The scientists forged ahead w ithout revising anything, because any revision would have seemed a retrogression ; they merely m ade an addition. W hen they ran into the discontinuous they still went on reducing everything to variations of energy ; they simply put the discontinuous into energy itself, which deprived the latter of all m eaning... They were unem barrassed by the difficulty of using the idea of probability as a bridge between the world as it is given to us and the hypothetical and purely m echanical world of ato m s; the consequences of the quantum theory, which derived from the study of probabi lity, led them to introduce probability am ong the atom s themselves. Thus the trajectories of atom ic particles are no longer called necessary but probable, and there is no necessity anywhere. A nd yet, probability can only be defined as a rigorous necessity, of whose conditions some are known and others unknown ; the conception of probability, divorced from th at of necessity, is m eaningless.28
By thus abandoning necessity, we succum b to unintelligibility. This claim can be m ost easily exam ined by considering the way in which probability can only have m eaning if it can be m easured against necessity. It would be a m istake, for instance, to think th at W eil's requirem ent is m et by one fam iliar contem porary position. W hen a philosopher of science assim ilates scientists' reasoning to a " nom ological-deductive" model, he defers to a necessity of a sort. Any model lacking the invariability o f the law, or lacking the certainty of the deduction o f its consequences, fails, he claims, to be an adequate model o f explanation. So, when exceptional results accrue, they must be accounted for either by the scientist's error, or by a law-like statem ent of the exception -as a m odification o f the original law. (Thus stated, this is a traditional rationalist position, held in opposition to em piricism and other irrationalism s. It is a superficial curiosity th a t its contem porary defenders often count themselves em piri cists. An excellent defense of the traditional opposition to this position is Professor A nscom be's Inaugural L ecture,29 in which she argues th at necessity is not any part of the notion o f causal explanation. It is W eil's intention to account for both of these tem ptations.)
She begins with two related theses.30 First, a philosopher learns no more from the sciences than from the arts, from religion or from politics. O f course this is not to say th a t he cannot learn a great deal from physics, and from poetry, and other hum an endeavour. But, second, in the end physics cannot change philosophy. Philosophy is, am ong other things, about what m akes physics possible. Physicists are naive, and philosophers who agree even m oreso, when they claim to have m ade philosophical discoveries about determ inism , probability, and so on. Weil acknowledges that they do work m uch as described above.
W hen a physicist studies a problem he conceives a perfectly definite, perfectly closed system and allows nothing to enter it except what he has put there, and which can be expressed in a few phrases. O ften, he represents his system in the m anner of a m athem atician, by figures and form ulae; but he sometimes represents it by objects, and th at is w hat is called m aking an experim ent... N aturally, the experim ent som etim es succeeds and som etim es n o t.31
Weil also points to the im portance of the negligible in physics. It is that which has to be overlooked when accom odating particular cases to general rules, as a scientist would overlook m inute am ounts of friction when testing acceleration equations by rolling balls down inclined planes. The surfaces could not be perfectly sm ooth except in the theory. Weil co m p lain s: « N o t only do physicists neglect the negligible, as they ought to do by definition, but they are also inclined to neglect, even when they are m aking use o f it, the very notion of the negligible." 32 It is this neglect which allows them the illusion o f discovery when they run into the discontinuous. W hen a physicist whom she adm ires very much writes of the discovery of discontinuity by m odern physics, she says, not w ithout sa rc a sm :
It was suspected before the appearance o f quanta th at there is not only continuity in the universe but also discontinuity... It is only a physicist who can speak of " the apparent determ inism of the m acroscopic scale" . ... Look at the sea, and say if the shapes of the waves appear to reveal a very rigorous necessity! The tru th is th at nineteenth-century physicists believed there were no m ore things in heaven and earth than in their laboratory -and indeed in their laboratory only at the m om ent when an experim ent succeeded. Their excuse was their professional obsession but those who shared their belief w ithout th at excuse were fools. Physicists today have lost th at illu sio n ; so much the better, but they are wrong to think th at this m eans they are contributing som ething new. D eter minism , says M . de Broglie, can no longer be m aintained except as a " m eta physical postulate" . But it was never anything else for a m an o f any intelligence. And she adds, with reference to the " fools" w ithout excuse, " when we find that the ideas of Louis de Broglie about the contributions o f science to philosophy are not w orth o f a m ind like his, it is not him th a t we should blam e but the philosophers whom he has happened to m eet." 34
The necessity which W eil insists is the prerequisite for intelligibility is not, then, the determ inist or deductive-explanation thesis any m ore than it is the indeterm inist or contingent thesis. These concepts are both required for an understanding of the world, and their significance is itself dependent upon their being held in equilibrium . W hat does Weil m ean by claim ing th at probability can only m ake sense as a reflection of necessity? It is not ju st th a t a probability statem ent is itself a determ inate num erical ra tio ; nor ju st th at a probability " p" th at an A will be attended by a B is a disguised claim th at w hat is not (has not been, cannot be) determ ined is in fact the real explanation o f p, nam ely th a t an A is determ inately connected to a B except when a C interferes; nor that the estim ate of a probability will grow m ore accurate with additional data, approxim ating perfect accuracy as it approaches an infinity of data. Each of these is a way in which probability is only intelligible as an im age of necessity, but I think th a t W eil's fundam ental thought is yet another.
W hat often accom pagnies the view of contem porary physics in question is the em piricist idea th a t the reasoning involved, the algebra, for instance, is axiom atic and contentless, and derives its value only from its happening to perm it prediction of em pirical phenom ena. In a Lecture before the Prussian A cadem y of Science in 1921, Einstein said : " As far as the propositions o f m athem atics refer to reality, they are not certain ; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality." 35 In its purest form this is the view th a t necessity is m anm ade, th a t it is a relation am ong propositions, and is derived from the axiom s o f the system in which the propositions have their place. O bjects and events in the world are only contingently related. Thus it is also accidental when the theoretical necessities appear closely to resemble regularities in the world. In the view th at a priori tru ths are only abstract, Weil sees an e rro r; it is one which has led em piricists to attrib ute to rationalists the bêtise of thinking the world is nothing but embodied a priori truths (and known without recourse to the senses, indeed). (O f course this is a straw m an ; not even P lato was under the illusion th a t the em pirical world was perfect, or th at experience was dispensable.) W hat really distinguishes this view of reason from the correct one, Weil suggests, is th a t the form er speaks as though reason itself were a " m etaphysical postulate" , hypothetically adopted in hopes th at it would happen to be useful, and to be abandoned should it prove inefficient in the pursuit of practical ends. This Weil considers not only a m orally reprehensible view, but an incoherent one.3'' The proper view is rath er th at reason involves the apprehension of the necessity of equilibrium as a condition of scientific thought, as o f all else hum an. It is the prior and the ultim ate reality, that w ithout which the question of the relation of geom etry to physics could not even arise. The role o f necessity and equilibrium in every area in which thought is possible is an indispensable o n e ; to the extent that they are absent, thought is not possible. Since it is this which connects W eil's understanding of physics and Pythagoreanism with her understanding of the hum an sciences and m orality, I shall say m ore about the role of necessity and equilibrium while discussing the last topic of this paper.
Ill N otoriously, the P ythagoreans thought justice was a num ber, but Sim one Weil takes a rem ark attributed to A naxim ander (by Sim plicius) as the m ost profound text on the subject: " It is from this th a t things arise and to it their destruction returns them , according to necessity; for thing undergo from one another a punishm ent and an expiation because o f their injustices according to the order of tim e." 37 As Sim plicius adds, these are " rath er poetical term s" , but we have already considered the notion of num ber as the m ediator between the limited and the unlim ited. In the Politicus (or Statesm an), P lato speaks of num ber as the ju st m ean or m easure in every act and activity.38 Weil takes this prospect with com plete seriousness. When discussing the physicists' geom etrical models, which she adm its are abstractions rath er than existing things, she adds that they are:
... yet m ore real than the phenom ena present to our senses. The simplest of them, and sym bol o f all the others, is the balance, which can therefore sym bolize both knowledge o f the world and justice.
W hatever d epartm ent or aspect of nature or o f hum an life we may study, we have understood som ething when we have defined an equilibrium , and limits in relation to this equilibrium , and relations of com pensation linking successive ruptures o f equilibrium . This is also true for studies o f social life and of the hum an soul, and only in this way can they be sciences.39
Weil intends this to be a fundam ental m ethodological rem ark about the social sciences, and m any tim es in her writing on history, politics, economics, literature and 37. K i r k a n d R a v e n , fr a g m e n t 103a. I h a v e p re serv ed W e il's tra n s la tio n (On Science, p. 80). 38. P l a t o , The Statesm an, 285a. The digression on measurement (283c-285b), and its sequel on " suitability" as a standard (-287b), are closely related to the general position which Weil defends. 39. On Science, p. 81, (emphasis added).
religion she gives it concrete applications. I do not propose to discuss any examples of this aspect o f her work, although it m ay be illustrated, in passing, by my quoting from an essay on b a n k ru p tc y :
In every dom ain accessible to hum an thought and activity the key is provided by a certain conception of equilibrium , and w ithout it we only fumble in the dark... I propose instead to consider the way Weil uses " necessity" in her treatm ent o f ethics. She m akes a graceful transition from using it as the basis of intelligibility in the sciences, to using it in showing the relation between harm ony and virtue. This transition is one which has becom e much m ore widely understood in recent years due to the grow th o f interest in ecology. The biological study o f the internal relations of relatively closed life systems (once called the balance o f nature) is now popularly extended to include hum an productivity, natural resources, and the equilibrium o f the entire planet (the relatively closed system dram atically called " spaceship earth " ). This m akes up a study in which nearly all sciences have a part, from town planning to organic chem istry. W hen individuals conscientiously try to recycle their refuse, try to restrict themselves to a natural diet, take to bicycles instead of m otor cars, and so on, they do so on grounds of expediency and for scientific motives, as well as for m oral and aesthetic reasons. They m ay also be said to be expressing a view o f the nature of hum an life and m an 's place in creation. If W eil is right, this is not a curious m ixture of motives, but a unified and many-levelled response to a particular vision of the dem ands o f the principle of harm ony. Interestingly, when ill-health, ill-hum our and fore-shortened prospects for individuals and species alike are seen to be the results of m an 's swift exploitation of technique and resources in the pursuit o f progress, m any are moved to see this as a sort of revenge on the part of nature for m an's short sightedness and arrogance. W hat springs to mind is the line just cited from A naxim ander, " things undergo from one another a punishm ent... because of their injustices according to th e order of tim e." But even w ithout representing N ature as a m oral agent, we have here a clear exam ple of the notion of equilibrium playing a com bined role as a standard in scientific thought and a guiding principle in moral life.
One of W eil's favourites am ong the speeches of Socrates is this one to C allicles:
The wise tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth, and gods and men, are kept together by com m union and friendship and order (ko sm io teta ) and tem perance and ju stic e ; and that, my friend, is why they call this totality an " order" (kosm os) and not a dis-order or an intem perance. But it seems to me th at you have not paid attention to all this, clever though you are. You do not see that geom etrical equality has great power with gods and men. A ccording to you one ought to cultivate acquisitiveness; for you overlook geom etry.41 N um ber as the m ediation between the one and the indefinite is discussed as a principle o f m orals in the Philebus, also. It is connected with tem perance, of course, with balance in the face o f tem ptation, and with the avoidance of false pleasures.42 The final essential is to see the harm ony or equilibrium as such, to recognize the necessitywhich comes neither from ourselves nor from the world -for the divine principle it is. In connection with the natural p art of m an, for instance, with his physical needs, she w rites of the forces which govern the world and which m ake men obey. But she distinguishes a higher from a lower way o f seeing this aspect o f the world. The lower is to see it as force -brute, contendable with, either to be conquered or to be succum bed to with indulgence; the higher is to see it as necessity -to be m et with equanim ity if possible, and not to be exceeded. Especially is necessity not to be exceeded.43 To see necessity instead of force, she continues, is to release the spiritual in us.
This is not confined to physical needs and desires, for as Weil writes in the essay on the Pythagorean doctrine:
Necessity constitutes an order whereby each thing, being in its place, perm its all other things to exist. The m aintenance o f boundaries constitutes for m aterial things the equivalent of w hat the consent to the existence of others is for the hum an spirit, th at is to say charity tow ard one's neighbour. M oreover, for m an, in so far as he is a natural being, keeping within lim its is justice.
... The suprem e justice for us is acceptance o f the coexistence with ourselves o f all creatures... It is perm issible to have enemies, but not to desire that they should not exist... All crim es, all grave sins are particular forms o f the refusal of this coexistence.44 T he harm ony which is fundam ental to the structure o f understanding, and th a t which is the principle o f friendship and justice, and th at which is the m easure of sin and the object of the recognition o f necessity, are all one and the same.
W e are not norm ally inclined to agree with persons who speak in such a way. For contrast, here is an illustration o f a m ore ordinary way o f thinking o f necessity. In a letter to her brother, Weil claims that there is sadness but no anguish in the Greeks. " In struggling against anguish one never produces serenity ; the struggle against anguish only produces new forms of anguish. But the Greeks possessed grace from the beginning." (Seventy Letters, 44. Intim ations o f Christianity, pp. 185 and 189. See also First and Last N otebooks, pp. 8 5 -8 9 , on the relation of necessity to science and charity.
paper entitled, " Let N eeds Dim inish T h at Preferences M ay P rosper" ,45 David B raybrooke has given an excellent p ortrayal o f the view th at necessities are our com m on needs, and should be contrasted with the objects and products of our freedom , our creativity and our preferences. H e argues sensitively against the danger o f multiplying necessities beyond necessity -for instance, th at tendency to find, am id growing affluence, m ore and m ore com m odities which one " simply cannot do w ithout" , until one is com pletely dom inated by " essentials" . A nd where there is no discretionary (income) there can be no (econom ic) freedom. This is a libertarian view, which takes freedom and the escape from the dom ination of necessity to be o f the highest m oral im portance. O f two persons with equal resources, he will be the better, and happier, person who has m inim ized his subservience to necessities and has maxim ized his freedom to choose. This is also to some extent a view from the political right, for it is the well-to-do who often treat luxuries as necessities as a rationalization o f self-indulgence. W hen there is an escalation o f " necessities" from the political left, on the other hand, this is part o f a cam paign to increase the minimum living conditions o f the m ost poorly-off. These cases belong together, however, and B raybrooke's use of " necessity" and " preference" is a fam iliar and widely-accepted one.
Weil would turn this picture o f ours upside down. It is not that she would countenance the m ultiplication of needs ju st described. " Social goods" , she says, " are no m ore than reinforcem ents to the power of saying T \ " 46 and this she contrasts with the acceptance o f poverty. N ecessity is the enemy for the m an who says " I" . The virtue she would have us see is th a t o f self-abnegation, th at of the m an who truly prays, " T hy will, not mine, be done." 47 Weil would also argue th at our preference for the indulgence o f preferences should not be taken to be a good thing. " Seek first the kingdom and the justice o f the heavenly Father, and then receive whatever is given." 48 T o pursue this, however, would exceed the limits o f our paper by requiring an exam ination o f W eil's philosophical theology. The necessity which we m ust appre hend in the equilibrium which underlies any intelligibility is also the foundation o f all virtue, and as she puts it in these rath er poetical term s, " G od has inscribed his signature in necessity. 
